# # hosts.deny This file describes the names of the hosts which are # *not* allowed to use the local INET services, as decided # by the '/usr/sbin/tcpd' server. # # The portmap line is redundant, but it is left to remind you that # the new secure portmap uses hosts.deny and hosts.allow. In particular # you should know that NFS uses portmap! # # ORC standard: # # add to /etc/aliases: probe: root,root.pager # # TRAPS master on centurion, pokey # compare vs grep -v "#" /etc/inetd.conf # -and # netstat -a -n ; netstat -a # # turn off finger # # Copyright (c) 1998 Owl River Company # info@owlriver.com # # REV PH 980608 # # #in.tftpd: ALL: spawn ( ( echo in.tftpd probe from ; \ # /bin/date ; \ # /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ) | \ # /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ # /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # in.telnetd: ALL: spawn (( echo ============================== ; \ echo in.telnetd probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # in.ftpd: ALL: spawn (( echo ============================== ; \ echo in.ftpd probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # in.rshd: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo rsh probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # in.rlogind: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo rlogin probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # # Note that finger loops prohibit re-fingering finger # to avoid a self-induced DoS state -- rely on the # identd # in.fingerd: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo finger probe ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ echo check /var/log/secure ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # gn: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo gopher probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # imapd: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo imapd probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # ipop3d: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo ipop3d probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # ipop2d: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo ipop2d probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # # ALL: ALL # # # The tcpd program can even be used to control access to the mail # service. This can be useful when you suspect that someone is trying # out some obscure sendmail bug, or when a remote site is misconfigured # and keeps hammering your mail daemon. # # In that case, sendmail should not be run as a stand-alone network # listener, but it should be registered in the inetd configuration file. # For example: # # smtp stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/tcpd \ # /usr/lib/sendmail -bs # # You will still need to run one sendmail background process to handle # queued-up outgoing mail. A command like: # # /usr/lib/sendmail -q15m # # (no -bd' flag) should take care of that. You cannot really prevent # people from posting forged mail this way, because there are many # unprotected smtp daemons on the network. # # for BSD style /etc/rc.d/rc.M # -- in SysV -- change /etc/rc.d/init.d/sendmail arguments # # Start the sendmail daemon: #if [ -x /usr/sbin/sendmail ]; then # echo "Starting sendmail daemon (/usr/sbin/sendmail -bd -q 15m)..." # echo "Starting sendmail periodic - NOT daemon(/usr/sbin/sendmail \ # -q 15m)..." # /usr/sbin/sendmail -q 15m # # per tcp_wrappers/README # # fi # sendmail: ALL: spawn ( ( echo ============================== ; \ echo smtp probe from ; \ echo %d_#_%h_#_%c ; \ /bin/date ; \ /usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h ; \ /bin/sleep 5 ; \ /usr/sbin/traceroute %h ; \ echo ) | \ /usr/bin/tee -a /var/log/probelog | \ /bin/mail -s %d_%h_%c probe) & # # #